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The Political Economy of “Constitutional 
Political Economy” 
Jeremy K. Kessler* 
Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, constitutional history has experienced a 
renaissance.1  This revival had many causes, but three stand out: the 
Rehnquist Court’s attack on formerly sacrosanct features of the “New Deal 
agenda”;2 Reagan-Era reassessments of American political development by 
political scientists, historians, and historical sociologists;3 and the 
frustration of constitutional scholars with the inability of legal process 
theory or political philosophy to produce “authoritative constitutional 
principles.”4  Spurred by legal crisis and this mix of disciplinary innovation 
and stagnation, law professors began to tell new stories about our 
constitutional heritage.5  They focused on the sources and significance of 
the New Deal’s “constitutional revolution,”6 while also re-examining the 
constitutionalism of the Founding and Reconstruction in light of New Deal 
transformations.7 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
1. See Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. 
REV. 1052, 1059–60 (2005) (recognizing that “New Deal scholarship became hot in the early 
1990s”). 
2. Id. at 1058–59. 
3. See id. at 1070–72 (describing the emergence of “new institutionalism”). 
4. G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 
485, 607 (2002). 
5. Id. 
6. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 5 (1998) (calling for re-examination of the conventional account 
of the “revolution,” according to which “the Supreme Court suddenly and substantially reversed 
its position in . . . 1937 . . . [in] response to such external political pressures as the 1936 election 
and the Court-packing plan”); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 
19–22 (1996) (reviewing competing accounts of the lessons learned from the Court’s change of 
course in 1937); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 205 (2000) 
(describing the “constitutional revolution” as an interpretive revolution that resulted in “a new 
orthodox conception of constitutional adaptivity”); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and 
Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1891, 1898–1934 (1994) (suggesting that a significant part of the Court’s transformation 
occurred before the Court-packing crisis of 1937). 
7. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 122–29 (1991) 
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (examining the relationship between the Founding and 
the New Deal); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 274–78 (1998) 
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (applying analysis of the New Deal to 
Reconstruction). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2808174 
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Given the centrality of the New Deal to this project, constitutional 
historians seemed to be heading toward a fundamental reconsideration of 
the relationship between constitutional law and political economy.  That is, 
after all, what New Deal constitutional conflict was all about: the extent to 
which the Constitution allowed a national political movement to alter the 
country’s economic life in fundamental and lasting ways.  And yet, the new 
generation of constitutional historians generally avoided political economy 
as such.  To be sure, their histories carefully reconstructed early twentieth-
century debates about the constitutional authority of the state and federal 
governments to displace common law economic regulation.  But the focus 
remained on the purely legal logics and purely political events that led the 
federal judiciary to get out of the business of adjudicating the constitutional 
merits of various schemes of economic regulation.8  The economic reasons 
that political and judicial actors might have had for transforming 
constitutional democracy received little attention.9 
This exclusion of economic reason from constitutional analysis is 
symptomatic of what Professors Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath call 
the “Great Forgetting.”10  From the Founding through the New Deal, 
Fishkin and Forbath demonstrate, the discourse of “constitutional political 
economy” was a fundamental feature of American constitutionalism.  It was 
only in the wake of the epochal New Deal synthesis—judicial deference to 
political regulation of the economy and judicial guardianship of civil liberty 
and equality—that constitutional political economy became something of a 
 
8. The dominant historiographical background was the contest between “externalists,” who 
asserted the primacy of politics over law in explaining the New Deal “revolution,” and 
“internalists,” who “highlight[ed] the primacy of law over politics, pointing to doctrinal changes 
that began well before 1937” and questioning the very premise that the New Deal was a 
“revolutionary” event.  Kalman, supra note 1, at 1054–55; see also WHITE, supra note 6, at 29–32 
(responding to Kalman’s reconstructed narrative).  Successful attempts to synthesize the two 
approaches have not transcended their shared assumption that law and politics exhaust the causal 
repertoire of constitutional change.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 7, at 
279–311 (portraying the conflict between the Old Court and the New Deal in terms of the proper 
relationship between law and politics in a democracy); DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S 
NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940, at 6–7 (2014) 
(asserting that the “crucial factor” in the Court’s response to the New Deal was “the proper design 
of the administrative state[, which] combined politics and law”). 
9. For a detailed and explicit repudiation of the political-economic analysis of constitutional 
change, see ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 7, at 203–21.  For a notable exception, see 
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA 
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 199 (1993) (“[T]he Lochner era is the story of how a changing 
social structure exposed the conservatism and class bias inherent in dominant ideological 
structures first formulated and institutionalized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution; it is the 
story of how an ideology that was fairly (albeit not completely) inclusive around the time of the 
founding became more and more exclusive as . . . capitalist forms of production matured.”). 
10. JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7–8) (on file with the Texas Law Review). 
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dead language.11  Prior to that time, constitutional actors across the 
ideological spectrum spoke in terms of constitutional political economy, 
believing that “economics and politics [we]re inextricably linked, and [that] 
a republican constitution require[d] a republican political economy to 
sustain it, and vice versa.”12 
By recovering this language, Fishkin and Forbath’s book-in-progress, 
The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, offers a radical alternative to the 
constitutional histories that emerged in the 1990s to defend the New Deal 
synthesis.  Fishkin and Forbath’s new constitutional history13 promises to 
recast the New Deal as a contingent and incomplete resolution of a 
centuries-long struggle to achieve the political-economic conditions that the 
Constitution requires—“requires” in the double sense of “demands” and 
“depends upon.”  This struggle is still ongoing and even accelerating, 
Fishkin and Forbath report, yet it has become increasingly “one-sided.”14  
First, the post-WWII economic boom dissipated, taking with it much of the 
middle class that the New Deal and Great Society legal orders had hoped to 
create.15  Then, conservative lawyers and politicians stepped up their attacks 
on the New Deal and Great Society’s remaining achievements, trumpeting a 
constitutional political economy in which private property free of 
overweening public management is the pillar of constitutional democracy.16  
Confronted by these dire conditions, legal liberals have forgotten how to 
fight back, rendered mute by the New Deal synthesis itself, which ironically 
and erroneously implied that political economy was no longer a matter of 
constitutional concern.17  Hoping to even the odds, Fishkin and Forbath 
offer liberals a grammar of egalitarian constitutional political economy—
“the constitution of opportunity”—that was once spoken fluently and 
 
11. Id. (manuscript at 65–66). 
12. Id. (manuscript at 47). 
13. Professor Risa Goluboff has recently identified a different “new constitutional history,” 
one that emphasizes the contingency and pluralism of constitutional law, and the agency of 
“everyday” citizens and social movements in shaping that diverse and indeterminate legal field.  
See Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 
2326, 2329 (2013) (reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE (2012)); Risa 
Goluboff, The New Constitutional History: Toward a Manifesto (Apr. 12, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  Although Goluboff’s “new constitutional history” is clearly 
distinct from Fishkin and Forbath’s project, the former’s emphasis on social history has also raised 
questions of political economy that the constitutional history of the 1990s tended to neglect.  See 
generally RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE 
WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014); REUEL SCHILLER, 
FORGING RIVALS (2015); KAREN TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY (2016). 
14. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 72–73). 
15. Id. (manuscript at 70).  For the contingency of postwar prosperity on wartime dynamics, 
see THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 355–56 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014). 
16. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 73–76) (describing the libertarian 
revival). 
17. Id. (manuscript at 65–66). 
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effectively by those Americans who argued that the Constitution prohibited 
oligarchic concentrations of wealth and mandated the political and judicial 
construction of a broad, inclusive middle class.18  
By placing the discourse of political economy back at the center of 
constitutional debate, Fishkin and Forbath have—by any fair measure—
done more than enough.  Yet scholarly innovators tend to find the ranks of 
their critics swelled by those who have benefited most from their labor.  
This Essay is no exception to the oedipal rule.  It argues that Fishkin and 
Forbath could go further still in integrating political economy and 
constitutional history.  At times, their detailed analysis of the discourse of 
“constitutional political economy” comes at the expense of a more fully 
materialist account of the political-economic conditions and effects of that 
discourse.19  Such a discursive emphasis, in turn, risks an overly optimistic 
assessment of the past virtues and present utility of “the constitution of 
opportunity,” the egalitarian dialect of constitutional political economy that 
Fishkin and Forbath commend to legal liberals today.  
These criticisms are initial responses to an unfinished manuscript, 
generously shared by Fishkin and Forbath at an unusually early stage in 
order to benefit younger scholars working on similar subjects.  
Accordingly, they are intended not as conclusive judgments but rather as 
interjections in an ongoing conversation, one that will be significantly 
advanced by the publication of The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution.  
The remainder of this Essay proceeds in three Parts.  Part I traces 
Fishkin and Forbath’s ambivalent relationship with political economy to the 
earlier tradition of “critical legal history,”20 a tradition that provides The 
Anti-Oligarchy Constitution with a good deal of evidentiary support and 
methodological inspiration.  Although radical in its own way, critical legal 
history’s commitment to the primacy of legal ideas, institutions, and 
discourses over social and economic forces in explaining legal change may 
make it more rather than less difficult to “bring political economy back 
 
18. Id. (manuscript at 11–13). 
19. This critique seeks to reopen the debate about the “constitutive” power of law that Forbath 
and other “critical legal historians” won in the early 1990s, displacing an earlier tradition of 
American legal history that viewed law as “reflective” of more basic social and economic 
relations and needs.  See generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT ix–xiii (1991); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND 
IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 22 n.17 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal 
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (1984).  Questioning the constitutive—or constructive—power 
of legal discourse, however, need not entail a return to the Whiggish instrumentalism of 
midcentury American legal history or the more reductionist variants of Marxist legal theory.  See 
infra Part I. 
20. For overviews of the tradition, see Gordon, supra note 19; Jessica K. Lowe, Radicalism’s 
Legacy: American Legal History Since 1998, 36 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR NEUERE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 
288 (2014); and G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated 
Intellectual History, 40 SW. L.J. 819 (1986). 
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in”21 to constitutional history.  Notably, Forbath’s own contributions to 
critical legal history have always been distinctive in their sensitivity to the 
generative power of class conflict.22  It is surely this special sensitivity to 
the material conditions of legal change, rather than critical legal history’s 
generic interest in exploring the richness and presumed autonomy of legal 
discourse, that should guide the study of constitutional political economy 
going forward.  Parts II and III sketch an alternative interpretation of some 
of Fishkin and Forbath’s discursive evidence in light of neglected political-
economic factors. 
Part II proposes that for much of American history, the constitution of 
opportunity was an essentially antifeudal discourse spoken by various 
factions of the emerging bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.  Fishkin and 
Forbath do demonstrate that, at times, this discourse predicted and tried to 
mitigate the economic inequalities intrinsic to capitalist development.23  But 
the balance of their evidence suggests that, more often than not, the function 
of the constitution of opportunity was either to accelerate this development 
or to offer false hope about its consequences, or both.  Put differently, the 
constitutional language of political-economic “opportunity” that Fishkin 
and Forbath trace from the 1770s through the late nineteenth century 
echoed the uneven development of capitalism in a nation beset by “belated 
feudalism.”24  The utility of such an antifeudal discourse for contending 
with the inequalities of modern capitalism may be more limited than 
Fishkin and Forbath suggest. 
 
21. Cf. BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN (Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al. eds., 
1985). 
22. See generally FORBATH, supra note 19; William E. Forbath, Courting the State: An Essay 
for Morton Horwitz, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 70 (Daniel W. 
Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010); William Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste]; William E. Forbath, Politics, State-
Building, and the Courts, 1870–1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 643 
(Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of 
Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767 (1985) [hereinafter 
Forbath, Ambiguities]. 
23. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 5). 
24. See generally KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM (1991).  For weaker versions of this 
argument, see AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT (1998); and ROBERT J. 
STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR (1991).  Forbath himself has described in great 
detail the process by which “[c]apitalist production arose unevenly in different places and 
industries over several decades, generally between the 1820’s and 1870’s,” while offering 
evidence that, at least in some sectors, the “ancient” common law of labor relations that Orren 
finds dominant throughout the nineteenth century was actually an invention of late nineteenth 
century courts.  Forbath, Ambiguities, supra note 22, at 801–06.  Splitting the difference, 
Christopher Tomlins has argued that only in the late eighteenth century did an American variant of 
the British common law tradition become dominant, heralding the subordination of labor relations 
to capital and displacing radical, alternative visions of the American mode of production, visions 
that would be revived without success in the 1820s and 1930s.  See TOMLINS, supra note 19, at 
23–26, 232–97. 
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Part III turns to the New Deal and the Great Forgetting of 
constitutional political economy that followed in its wake.  On a strict 
interpretation of the belated feudalism thesis, the victory won by the 
constitution of opportunity in 1937 represents little more than the 
achievement of properly capitalist labor relations outside the Jim Crow 
South.25  But even if the New Deal’s iteration of the constitution of 
opportunity did not only create a more stable capitalist society but also 
mitigated its economically inegalitarian tendencies, the popularity of this 
discourse was disturbingly brief.  Fishkin and Forbath’s evidence suggests 
that the constitution of opportunity enjoyed something like discursive 
supremacy during the nine years between the 1936 presidential campaign 
and President Roosevelt’s declaration of the “Second Bill of Rights” in 
1944.26  But then it went silent.27  The Great Forgetting occurred and 
constitutional political economy dropped out of mainstream constitutional 
discourse altogether, spoken only by economic libertarians intent on rolling 
back the New Deal as a constitutional aberration.28  This Part argues that 
Fishkin and Forbath’s explanation of the Great Forgetting neglects the 
determinate political-economic event of the post-WWII period: the United 
States’ war against communism, a war between monopoly capitalism and 
state socialism launched precisely at the moment when the economically 
egalitarian interpretation of constitutional political economy apparently 
became unspeakable.29  The word “communism” does not currently appear 
in Fishkin and Forbath’s text.  Yet the history of the relationship between 
American political economy and American constitutionalism in the second 
half of the twentieth century cannot be told without it. 
I. From Critical Legal History to “Constitutional Political Economy” 
From the perspective of American legal historiography, The Anti-
Oligarchy Constitution represents not only an alternative to the 
constitutional history of the 1990s, but also the culmination of a decades-
long project to recover the radical legal perspectives of American workers 
from the Founding Era to the early twentieth century.  This project rejected 
the traditional, “exceptionalist” account of American workers as lacking in 
 
25. ORREN, supra note 24, at 29–30; cf. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE 
UNIONS xi–xii (1985) (reaching a similar conclusion about the ultimate function of New Deal 
labor law, but arguing that radical alternatives to both precapitalist and capitalist labor relations 
were on the table in the early twentieth century).  For Southern labor relations during the New 
Deal, see IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF 131–94 (2013). 
26. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 58–61). 
27. Id. (manuscript at 64–65). 
28. Id. (manuscript at 73). 
29. See generally CAMBELL CRAIG & FREDRIK LOGEVALL, AMERICA’S COLD WAR (2009); 
Anders Stephanson, Cold War Degree Zero, in UNCERTAIN EMPIRE 19 (Joel Isaac & Duncan Bell 
eds., 2012). 
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“class consciousness” and possessed of an individualistic ideology that 
distinguished them from their European peers.30  Drawing on new 
scholarship in labor history, William Forbath and fellow critical legal 
historians in the 1980s and 1990s insisted that the “history of the workplace 
in industrializing America is one of recurring militancy and of class-based, 
as well as shop- and craft-based, collective action.”31  Given this long 
record of radicalism, new puzzles emerged: 
[W]hy, by the early 20th century, did most [workers] end up 
supporting unions and political parties that were more conservative 
than those embraced by their counterparts abroad?  If the American 
labor movement was not born with a comparatively narrow interest 
group outlook or an inveterate bias against broad, positive uses of 
law and state power, then how did that outlook and bias become 
dominant in the labor movement by the early 1900s?32 
In answering these questions, critical legal historians distinguished 
themselves by looking beyond the traditional social and economic 
explanations: greater economic mobility and greater ethnic and racial 
conflict gradually eroded worker solidarity.33  Decentering these more 
materialist accounts, Forbath and others argued that law took the whip hand 
when it came to breaking worker radicalism in late nineteenth century 
America.34  Then, workers pressed a radical legal vision that would have 
given them greater autonomy in the workplace and a greater share of the 
returns to capital, but they were defeated in the courts.35  Confronted by late 
nineteenth century labor militancy, a probusiness judiciary con-
stitutionalized outdated and sometimes mythical common law rules that 
constrained labor activism, prolabor health and safety regulations, and 
 
30. William E. Forbath, Courts, Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England and America: A 
Study of the Constitutive Power of Law, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 5–6 (1991). 
31. Id. at 6. 
32. Id. at 7. 
33. Id. at 7–9. 
34. See generally FORBATH, supra note 19; VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND 
STATE POWER (1993); TOMLINS, supra note 19; TOMLINS, supra note 25. 
35. See FORBATH, supra note 19, at 6–8 (arguing that judicial review “helped make broad 
legal reforms seem futile”); HATTAM, supra note 34, at ix (arguing that “a strong judiciary created 
a politically weak labor movement in the United States”); TOMLINS, supra note 25, at 68 (“The 
combination of sustained judicial condemnation and employer hostility . . . contributed to a 
pronounced fall in [unions’] overall rate of growth, beginning soon after the turn of the century.”). 
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prolabor schemes of economic redistribution.36  In response, the labor 
movement was forced to trim its sails.37 
Why did a group of legal historians committed to rediscovering the 
radicalism of American workers privilege legal over social and economic 
explanation, even where—as in Forbath’s case38—their histories took 
careful note of the material interests of the relevant legal actors, including 
the class position of the judiciary?  One obvious answer is that the 
prevailing nonlegal explanations were not supported by sufficient empirical 
evidence.39  But critical legal historians tended to harbor a much broader 
methodological—and even metaphysical—objection to social and economic 
explanations of legal change.  This objection stemmed from their critique of 
the then-dominant “law-and-society” school of legal history.40  Law-and-
society historians viewed law as reflective of, and responsive to, the 
“needs” or “interests” of American society.41  In its most politically 
conservative form, this “functionalist” or “instrumentalist” historiography 
described legal change as a rational process of resolving social and 
economic problems that ineluctably led to greater social and economic 
welfare.42  While many law-and-society historians distanced themselves 
from such a Panglossian description of American legal development, 
critical legal historians nonetheless viewed the law-and-society approach as  
 
 
 
 
36. See Forbath, Ambiguities, supra note 22, at 805 (noting the ahistoricism of “supposedly 
time-honored and inviolable [property] rights” developed by courts in the late nineteenth century); 
see also FORBATH, supra note 19, at 6–8 (noting that the “courts’ harshly repressive law of 
industrial conflict helped make broad, inclusive unionism seem too costly”); HATTAM, supra note 
34, at 30 (describing the use of the common law doctrine of criminal conspiracy “to regulate the 
increased harm that often accompanied collective action”). 
37. See, e.g., FORBATH, supra note 19, at 96–97 (“In the shadow of so many broken big 
strikes and bootless broad initiatives, many thought it wise to conserve and build upon what 
‘worked’—minimalist politics, craft unionism, high dues, and restrained but well-calculated strike 
policies.”); HATTAM, supra note 34, at 204 (arguing that labor “[v]oluntarism . . . was the AFL’s 
strategic response to the unusual configuration of state power in the United States,” namely the 
existence of “an obstructionist court from 1865 through 1895”). 
38. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
39. Cf. Forbath, supra note 30, at 79 (noting the inadequacy of many traditional 
socioeconomic explanations for the comparative weakness of the American labor movement, such 
as the hypothesis that American workers enjoyed unprecedented opportunities to enter the middle 
class). 
40. For a highly sensitive critique of law-and-society historiography, see Gordon, supra note 
19, at 59–87.  For an earlier, more uncompromising critique, see Mark V. Tushnet, Perspectives 
on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman’s “A History of American 
Law,” 1977 WIS. L. REV. 81 (1977). 
41. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 5974; Lowe, supra note 20, at 288; White, supra note 20, 
at 832. 
42. Gordon, supra note 19, at 59–65. 
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tainted by teleology and political quietism—an at-best unwitting defense of 
the “liberal capitalism”43 that had come to dominate modern American 
society.44 
Given their political objections to the law-and-society approach, an 
obvious place for critical legal theorists to turn would have been Marxism, 
and a few did.45  But one of the most striking aspects of critical legal history 
was its propensity to attack the “instrumentalism” of Marxist legal theory 
with almost as much vigor as it attacked the “liberal instrumentalism” of 
law-and-society scholars.46  While Marxist instrumentalism might have 
“considerably more explanatory bite” than the liberal alternative, it was 
nonetheless beset by “a great many problems,” the greatest being its 
assumption that the content of law was determined by—and ineluctably 
served the interests of—a dominant, capitalist class.47  Just like liberal 
instrumentalism, then, Marxist instrumentalism treated law as a mere 
reflection of more basic social and economic relations.48  Rejecting both 
 
43. Id. at 59. 
44. See White, supra note 20, at 83335.  For a powerful interpretation of the political 
background of critical legal history, tracing its roots to disillusionment with midcentury 
modernization theory, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 437–77 
(1995). 
45. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, in 1 MARXIST 
PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978). 
46. Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW 641, 64446 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
47. Id. at 646; see also id. at 653–54 (explaining that critical legal theory differs from “most 
forms of Marxist thought” in several other respects as well: in its refusal to “treat capitalism as a 
totalizing system”; in its recognition that “the forms of liberal-democratic-capitalism that we are 
used to are only a few among the many ways of being liberal-democratic-capitalist” and that 
“among the forms that might be brought into being, ours are both worse and better”; in its 
affirmation that “[t]he resources for ‘revolutionary reform’ are . . . often to be found in our own 
traditions, customs, and practices”; and in its rejection of the idea that legal reform must be 
“oriented toward capture of central state machinery”).  Such wide-ranging criticisms of 
Marxism—going well beyond the supposed instrumentalism of Marxist legal theory—were 
characteristic of critical legal history in its heyday.  See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 19, at 20 
(citing V. I. LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE? (1937)) (“Contrary to classic theories of revolution . . . 
transformative action does not need to be qualitatively distinct from the normal or routine 
activities which reinforce [social] contexts.”). 
48. This rather simplistic characterization of Marxist legal theory was in keeping with the 
highly influential, mid-1970s polemics of the English historian E. P. Thompson.  See generally 
E. P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY & OTHER ESSAYS (1978); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS 
AND HUNTERS (1975). Thompson unfortunately issued these attacks on Marxist legal theory 
without the benefit of access to his primary antagonists’ contemporaneous writings, which offered 
significant correctives to earlier, more reductive accounts of the relationship between law and 
political economy.  See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ON THE REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM 53–170 
(G. M. Goshgarian trans., Verso 2014); NICOS POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM (Patrick 
Camiller trans., Verso 2014). Given Thompson’s contempt for both men, and his ideological 
commitment to the rule of law as “an unqualified human good,” THOMPSON, WHIGS AND 
HUNTERS, supra at 266, it is unlikely that familiarity with their later work would have altered his 
views.  Critical legal historians, however, have always been uncomfortable with Thompson’s 
normative evaluation of Anglo-American law, if not his historical methodology.  See, e.g., 
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liberal and Marxist instrumentalism, critical legal historians argued that law 
was “constitutive”—not reflective—of social and economic relations.49  
Furthermore, law’s constitutive power was inherently “indeterminate,” 
capable of being used by legal actors in a variety of different ways, toward 
a variety of different social, economic, and political ends.50  In light of the 
constitutive and indeterminate nature of law, critical legal historians 
insisted that explanations of legal change would not generally be found in 
“deeper”51 social or economic factors, but rather in the field of law itself, 
where self-consciously legal actors contended with each other and with 
legal institutions over the meaning of legal “language.”52 
The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution owes a clear debt to Forbath’s earlier 
work and to other critical legal histories of American labor relations.  The 
book supplements the evidence base of these histories in two main ways: 
first, by emphasizing the extent to which workers, their advocates, and their 
adversaries spoke in distinctively constitutional terms;53 second, by 
incorporating a more complex account of the role that race played in 
shaping these discursive battles.54  While Fishkin and Forbath do not 
explicitly adopt critical legal history’s methodological tenets (and while 
Forbath was always more materialist than other critical legal historians), the 
importance of legal discourse to explaining legal change persists and 
presents something of a contradiction.  On the one hand, Fishkin and 
Forbath’s manuscript seeks to break with the constitutional history of the 
1990s, a historiography that marginalized the political-economic nature of 
American constitutionalism.55  On the other hand, the manuscript remains 
marked by the critical legal history of the 1980s and 1990s, a historiography 
that asserted the primacy of legal discourse over social and economic forces 
 
TOMLINS, supra note 19, at 22, 22 n.18 (embracing Thompson’s “unexceptionable critique of 
instrumentalism” but criticizing his utopian evaluation of “the rule of law”); Morton J. Horwitz, 
The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 565 (1977) (book review) 
(criticizing Thompson’s failure to apply his normative analysis of the rule of law to the relevant 
historical data).  Accordingly, legal historians in the critical tradition might yet find something of 
value in Marxist alternatives to law-and-society instrumentalism and their own post-Marxist 
constructivism, especially to the extent that they seek to specify the causal relationship between 
economic inequality and legal change.  The alternative, a tragic legal liberalism, is spelled out in 
Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Morton Horwitz Wrestles with the Rule of Law, in 2 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 483 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. 
Brophy eds., 2010). 
49. FORBATH, supra note 19, at ix–xiii; TOMLINS, supra note 19, at 26; Gordon, supra note 
19, at 100–09. 
50. FORBATH, supra note 19, at 170–72; TOMLINS, supra note 19, at 19–20; Gordon, supra 
note 19, at 114. 
51. Forbath, supra note 30, at 4. 
52. FORBATH, supra note 19, at 170–71. 
53. Forbath laid the groundwork for this move in his bravura article, Caste, Class, and Equal 
Citizenship.  See Forbath, Caste, supra note 22. 
54. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 13–58). 
55. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
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in explaining legal change.56  The result is a constitutional history that 
insists on the centrality of political economy but analyzes it primarily as a 
species of legal discourse rather than as a material structure of power.  
Ironically, then, the legacy of critical legal history risks pulling Fishkin and 
Forbath’s project back in the direction of mainstream constitutional history.  
Although these two, roughly contemporaneous historiographical traditions 
had quite different political valences, they actually shared the same post-
Marxist tendency to discount the material conditions of legal change. 
Beginning with the methodological assumption that both traditions 
rejected—the assumption that political economy is determinative57 of legal 
ideas, institutions, and discourses—might lead Fishkin and Forbath to a 
different interpretation of their evidence.  This Essay does not purport to 
defend this alternative assumption—the defenses are well-known and were 
available, if unpopular, at the time of critical legal history’s formation58—or 
to offer an exhaustive reinterpretation of The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution.  
It suggests only that critical legal history’s emphasis on the “relative 
autonomy” of law,59 absent a symmetrical emphasis on the “relative 
autonomy” of political economy, is responsible for some of the more 
puzzling features of Fishkin and Forbath’s history of constitutional political 
economy.  These features may become less puzzling once the political-
economic conditions of legal discourse are more fully incorporated into the 
story. 
 
56. See supra notes 42–54 and accompanying text. 
57. “Determinative” is often read to mean “absolutely” or “exhaustively” determinative.  
There is no reason to do so.  At the Symposium, David Grewal helpfully proposed the phrase 
“negative determinism,” connoting the idea that material forces take some legal and political 
possibilities off the table, but do not determine the selection among those that remain.  
Alternatively, the concept of “determination in the last instance” suggests a stronger, positive 
determinism that nonetheless ascribes agency, contingency, and efficacy to legal and political 
conflicts.  See ALTHUSSER, supra note 48, at 5356, 14063, 20931 (arguing that the 
“reproduction of the relations of production” depends on relatively autonomous legal and political 
apparatuses and the defeat of working class insurgencies that occur within them). 
58. See, e.g., LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ESSAYS IN SELF-CRITICISM (Grahame Lock trans., 1976); 
PERRY ANDERSON, ARGUMENTS WITHIN ENGLISH MARXISM (1980); POULANTZAS, supra note 
48. 
59. Gordon, supra note 19, at 101.  Critical legal historians’ adoption of the language of 
relative autonomy was peculiar given the origins and function of that term in Marxist state theory.  
See RALPH MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 51 (1969); NICOS POULANTZAS, 
POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES 190–91 (Timothy O’Hagan trans., 1973).  For these 
theorists, saying that legal or political institutions could achieve relative autonomy did not entail 
any limit to materialist explanation.  To the contrary, the capacity of such institutions to act 
against the short-term interests of dominant class fractions was explicable in terms of the longer-
term interests of capitalist development.  Id.  As used by critical legal historians, however, law’s 
relative autonomy generally implied an epistemological or metaphysical break, such that at least 
some legal phenomena exceeded materialist explanation.  See supra notes 42–54 and 
accompanying text. 
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II. The Constitution of Opportunity Between Feudalism and Capitalism 
In the same year that Forbath placed the “constitutive” power of law at 
the center of the history of American labor relations,60 Karren Orren’s 
Belated Feudalism offered an alternative interpretation of that history.61  
While Orren did not deny the power of legal actors to shape American 
political economy, she placed greater emphasis on the fact that these actors 
operate within “real” political-economic structures that “channel and react 
to events and lend a direction to historical change.”62  In particular, Orren 
argued that for most of its political-economic history, the United States 
featured relations of production with a markedly feudal cast, pervaded by 
the same law of master and servant that had governed wage labor since the 
fourteenth century.63  That is, wage labor in the United States was long 
defined by the distinctive feature of the feudal mode of production: the 
direct extraction of labor power by legal and political coercion, in the form 
of the criminalization of vagrancy and the judicial prescription of the 
conditions of employment.64  According to Orren, this feudal regime of 
American labor governance provided “the foundation of capitalist 
development”: the expansion of free markets in commodities depended on 
unfree labor markets in both the North and the South.65  On this account, the 
unionization movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries  
 
 
 
 
60. FORBATH, supra note 19, at x. 
61. See generally ORREN, supra note 24. 
62. Karren Orren, Institutions, Antinomies, and Influences in Labor Governance, 19 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 187, 189 (1994). 
63. ORREN, supra note 24, at 12, 71–79. For the classic debates about the relationship 
between the development of waged labor and the development of capitalism, see generally THE 
BRENNER DEBATE (T. H. Aston & C. H. E. Philipin eds., 1985); THE TRANSITION FROM 
FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM (Verso 1978). 
64. See ORREN, supra note 24, at 68–117.  Under a capitalist regime of labor governance, by 
contrast, labor power is extracted by means of economic coercion—the unequal bargaining power 
between capital and labor that determines employment contracts in a free labor market. 
65. Id. at 70; see also Orren, supra note 62, at 190 (“I see the late 19th century as a period in 
which commercial relations were governed along voluntary principles and labor along prescriptive 
ones.  But more than that: the voluntarism of commercial relations in the 19th century presumed 
hierarchy in labor relations for its effective functioning . . . .”).  In hypothesizing the asynchronous 
development of capitalism in labor and commercial relations, Orren happily pillaged traditional 
Marxist theory, and presaged contemporary American scholarship on the history of slavery and 
capitalism.  See, e.g., WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS 2–3 (2013) (emphasizing the 
interrelationship between the development of global commodities markets and the persistence of 
slave labor in the South).  At the same time, Marxist theorists and historians have gradually 
renounced the traditional view of a sharp break between feudalism and capitalism, noting the 
persistence of feudal political and labor relations well into the twentieth century.  For an overview, 
see generally A History of Separation: The Rise and Fall of the Workers’ Movement, 1883-1982, 
ENDNOTES, Oct. 2015. 
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represented not a thwarted attempt to achieve social democracy but the 
long-delayed transition of American labor relations from feudalism to 
capitalism.66 
In its purest form, the thesis of Belated Feudalism remains 
controversial,67 although Forbath and others have cited it approvingly for 
the softer thesis that “the law of the employment relationship in nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century America remained one of hierarchy and 
subordination, of status as much as of free contract.”68  In any event, this 
Part invokes Belated Feudalism not as a more accurate narrative of 
American labor relations than that provided by the critical legal historians, 
but rather as one example of a political economic metanarrative within 
which Fishkin and Forbath’s account of constitutional political economy 
could be fruitfully situated.  Indeed, one continually catches glimpses of 
this metanarrative—the surprisingly long political-economic struggle for 
capitalism and against feudalism—while reading The Anti-Oligarchy 
Constitution. 
To begin with, the founding tenets of the constitution of opportunity 
tradition were explicitly antifeudal in character: the abolition of 
“hierarchies, titles, and aristocratic forms of privilege,” including 
“primogeniture and entail”; and the formation of a “republic” of 
enfranchised property holders, a mix of merchant and agrarian elites and 
white male settlers who were able “to exit the wage labor market” due to 
“relatively high wages” and the availability of “[c]heap fertile land.”69  This 
nascent capitalist order, however, depended on the persistence of an 
essentially feudal class of “property-less, super-exploited labor generally 
not freemen but enslaved for life.”70  This order also featured an unresolved 
disagreement: whether the legal abolition of feudal property relations was 
sufficient to secure a property-owning republic71 (abolition of feudal labor 
relations, according to Orren, was not yet on the table);72 or whether, 
instead, continued political management of property relations would be 
necessary.73  Over the next century, those who held the latter view would 
promulgate a welter of competing programs with shifting political 
 
66. See ORREN, supra note 24, at 209–30. 
67. For an early critique, see Catherine Fisk, Still “Learning Something of Legislation”: The 
Judiciary in the History of Labor Laws, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 151 (1994).  For a more 
thoroughgoing attack on the idea of continuity between feudal labor relations and American labor 
law, see CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND (2010). 
68. Forbath, Caste, supra note 22, at 21 & nn.86 & 89 (citing ORREN, supra note 24F); see 
also STANLEY, supra note 24, at 83–84 & n.41 (citing ORREN, supra note 24). 
69. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 13–14). 
70. Id. (manuscript at 14). 
71. Id. (manuscript at 15) (“An end to primogeniture and entail, Webster argued, would 
produce, over time, that ‘equality of property’ that is ‘the very soul of a republic.’”). 
72. ORREN, supra note 24, at 68–71. 
73. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 15). 
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economic valences: from plans for general education so that the children of 
poorer families might one day hold civil office (quite radical at the 
Founding, though derided by Fishkin and Forbath in its late twentieth-
century variant as not a political-economic program for achieving a 
democracy of opportunity);74 to more activist schemes of property 
redistribution (very radical if rarely implemented);75 to more mandarin 
schemes of monetary policy and infrastructure investment (not radical when 
pursued by Federalists at the national level, somewhat radical when pursued 
by the Democratic–Republican Party at the state level, less radical when 
pursued by the “new Republicanism” once again at the national level, more 
radical when pursued by populists and progressives in the early twentieth 
century).76 
Fishkin and Forbath place great emphasis on the political defeat of the 
Federalists, after which “no mainstream party ever again openly proclaimed 
itself the party of elite rule.”77  From then on, they explain, parties “might 
defend the wealthy, but not the wealthy’s right to rule . . . always 
proclaim[ing] fealty to ‘equal rights’ and broad distribution of prosperity 
for the producing classes.”78  But this “dialectic . . . of constitutional 
political-economic discourse”79 is as striking for its political-economic 
ambiguity as for its radicalism.  As Fishkin and Forbath note, this dialectic 
was used by the new Republicans to defend the second national bank, and 
they spoke it all the way into the Panic of 1819, “the nation’s first 
‘traumatic awakening to the capitalist reality of boom and bust.’”80  As 
articulated by a party dominated by “rising enterprisers and Southern 
planters” and swelled by smallholders, opposition to “the wealthy’s right to 
rule” and support for “equal rights” and “prosperity” for independent 
producers sound less like a radical agenda than the minimal legal conditions 
for a capitalist polity where political membership was tied to modest 
property qualifications.81 
Of course, this negative assessment is terribly teleological, and what 
matters most for Fishkin and Forbath is the elasticity of the dialectic of 
 
74. Id. (manuscript at 15–18, 71). 
75. Id. (manuscript at 15). 
76. Id. (manuscript at 18–23, 75–76). 
77. Id. (manuscript at 24). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. (manuscript at 23) (quoting CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION 137 
(1991)). 
81. Id. (manuscript at 23–24); cf. Michael Zakim & Gary J. Kornblith, Introduction: An 
American Revolutionary Tradition, in CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND 1, 10 (Michael Zakim & 
Gary J. Kornblith eds., 2012) (arguing that the “contradictions—dare we say, dialectics—of a 
society organizing itself around the liquidity, fungibility, and incessant maximizations of the 
commodity were largely lost on an American gentry anticipating a bright future of material 
abundance”). 
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“opportunity”—its ability to accommodate “thicker distributional claims” 
when formal talk of equal rights “grew strained and thin.”82  And, according 
to Fishkin and Forbath, that is just what the dialectic did during the 
Jacksonian period: 
Jackson’s war on the Bank was the centerpiece of a broader 
questioning of how American capitalism was taking shape.  With the 
Panic of 1819 and the economic pain that followed, a breach had 
opened between the party elites and ordinary farmer- and worker-
voters over the paths of national and regional development the elites 
were blazing. . . .  A farmer-worker populace, voting directly, in 
mass numbers, in a presidential election for the first time . . . 
muster[ed] democracy against “the paper system” and its “new 
aristocracy” of enterprise. . . .  Not until FDR would a presidential 
candidate again speak so plainly about the realities of class divisions 
and the incompatibility of political democracy and economic 
oligarchy.  Voters who readily accepted that they were the “poor 
Many” fighting off the “wealthy Few” exercised their suffrage for 
what the new Democratic Party press heralded as a “Constitutional 
Millennium.”83 
Jacksonian Democracy undoubtedly marked a major transformation in 
our constitutional system, but the political-economic benefits of this 
“Constitutional Millennium” prove difficult to pin down.84  First, as Fishkin 
and Forbath readily acknowledge, “Jacksonians wedded white farmers’ and 
workers’ democratic aspirations to the racist causes of southern slavery and 
Indian Removal.”85  Accordingly, “[s]laves’ and women’s productive work 
was . . . excluded from the Jacksonians’ generous conception of equality for 
the nation’s producers,”86 as the promise of white male property 
ownership—still recognized as the basis of real political-economic 
freedom—became irredeemably tied to violent territorial expansion.87 
Second, the growth of the franchise that undergirded Jacksonian 
populism was itself a mixed political-economic bag, sundering the concepts 
of political and economic freedom in troubling ways.  At the Founding, 
Gouverneur Morris and James Madison had fought for higher property 
qualifications for national elections precisely to forestall a return to 
“aristocracy.”88  Madison explained that the British Parliament had become 
 
82. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 24). 
83. Id. (manuscript at 24–25). 
84. The canonical negative assessment is SELLERS, supra note 80.  For criticism of Sellers’s 
method, if not the balance of his conclusions, see Zakim & Kornblith, supra note 81, at 6–7. 
85. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 27). 
86. Id. 
87. See AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 99–175 (2010). 
88. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 18–19 (rev. ed. 2009). 
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corrupted because property qualifications were too low.89  Expanding on the 
point, Morris warned: 
Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell 
them to the rich. . . .  The time is not distant when this country will 
abound with mechanics and manufacturers, who will receive their 
bread from their employers.  Will such men be the secure and 
faithful guardians of liberty?  Will they be the impregnable barrier 
against aristocracy?90 
As this quote indicates, the heart of the argument for property-based 
suffrage was the reality that wage laborers were not free but bound, 
economically and legally, to their masters: “Those who were subject to 
another’s government—that is, all those either legally or economically 
dependent on others—should, as people who were ruled in their private 
lives, be excluded from governance.”91  The propertyless represented what 
Orren called the feudal remnant of American society, and as such were the 
closest link to the feudal past that the Founders hoped to escape.92  In a 
compromise, the question of economic qualifications for national suffrage 
was left to the state governments; at the time of the Founding, somewhere 
between thirty and forty percent of white men could not vote.93 
The gradual elimination of property-based political citizenship was 
tied to a commercial and demographic explosion that swelled the cities and 
pushed the nation westward.  The population more than doubled between 
1790 and 1820, from less than four million to just under ten, and doubled 
again by 1850.94  By then, nearly all economic barriers to white male 
suffrage, whether in the form of property holding or tax payments, had 
fallen.95  Yet the new property-poor and propertyless voters—the “Poor 
Many” who swept Jackson and his party into power96—found themselves in 
a “contradictory state of affairs,” their “political rights of self-government 
joined to economic vulnerability and dependence.”97  The decoupling of 
property ownership from republican self-government led to the political 
emancipation of the poor, but it also made the “power of property to 
govern . . . more difficult to see and attack.”98  As Robert Steinfeld puts it: 
As the nineteenth century wore on, wage workers complained more 
and more bitterly that the power of property was making them slaves 
 
89. Id. at 18. 
90. Id. 
91. STEINFELD, supra note 24, at 185. 
92. ORREN, supra note 24, at 228–30. 
93. KEYSSAR, supra note 88, at 19–21. 
94. Id. at 22. 
95. Id. at 24–25. 
96. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 24–25). 
97. STEINFELD, supra note 24, at 186. 
98. Id. at 186–87. 
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to their employers. . . .  But their argument was . . . difficult and [] 
contradictory.  Having prevailed in their contention that they were 
among the self-governing . . . and having gained the franchise on this 
basis, wage workers found it more difficult to argue that their 
propertylessness subjected them to the rule of others.99 
The Jacksonian discourse of constitutional political economy that 
Fishkin and Forbath celebrate undoubtedly gave voice to the political-
economic frustrations of this new mass polity.100  But it is less clear that 
constitutional attacks on the “moneyed aristocracy” of Northern industry 
and banking offered this polity much economic relief.101  Summarizing the 
Jacksonian diagnosis of the country’s ills, Fishkin and Forbath write that 
“[t]he central problem was that economic inequality inevitably has 
corrosive effects on political equality.”102  But the erosion of political rights 
that the propertyless had only recently won—a victory partly attributable to 
the economic forces that also oppressed them—was simply not the central 
problem they faced.  Nor was it “the accumulation of overgrown individual 
fortunes.”103  Their most pressing problems were rather local employers, 
landlords, and lenders, and the laws that governed relations between 
them.104  Having just cast off one vestige of actual feudalism, politically 
emancipated white men still faced feudal labor relations in some regions 
and industries, and equally or more exploitative capitalist labor relations in 
others.105  The antifeudal accents of Jacksonian constitutional political 
economy certainly had rhetorical appeal, but it remains unclear to what 
extent they offered economic respite to the new electoral class.106 
 
99. Id. at 187. 
100. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 24–25). 
101. Id. (manuscript at 25–26). 
102. Id. (manuscript at 26). 
103. Id. (quoting 8 REG. DEB. 3359 (1832) (statement of Rep. Bell)). 
104. For employer–employee relations, see the discussions of sources supra note 24.  For 
landlords and lenders, see Elizabeth Blackmar, Inheriting Property and Debt: From Family 
Security to Corporate Accumulation, in CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND, supra note 81, at 93–95; 
Jonathan Levy, The Mortgage Worked the Hardest: The Fate of Landed Independence in 
Nineteenth-Century America, in CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND, supra note 81, at 39. 
105. For the persistence of feudal labor relations, see generally ORREN, supra note 24; 
STEINFELD, supra note 24.  For the antebellum shift in the labor force toward “highly productive 
industrial and commercial elements of the economy,” see Robert E. Gallman & John Joseph 
Wallis, Introduction, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STANDARDS OF LIVING BEFORE 
THE CIVIL WAR 1, 3 (Robert E. Gallman & John Joseph Wallis eds., 1992) [hereinafter AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH]. 
106. One obstacle to bringing political economy back into early republican constitutional 
history is the relative paucity of data that confronts economic historians of the period, especially 
with respect to the propertyless and property poor.  For overviews of the problem, see Robert A. 
Margo, Wages and Prices During the Antebellum Period: A Survey and New Evidence, in 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 105, at 173; Lee Soltow, Inequalities in the Standard 
of Living in the United States, 1798–1875, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 105, at 
121. 
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Fishkin and Forbath seem to recognize this uncertain fit between 
rhetoric and reality when they turn to the third ambiguity of Jacksonian 
constitutional political economy: that it could be so quickly co-opted by 
democracy’s opponents, the Whigs.  While “Whigs spurned [the] ‘leveling’ 
outlook” of Jacksonians, “[t]hey shared with their foes the . . . republican 
maxim [that] the citizen’s political equality and independence must rest on 
a measure of economic independence, and that demanded property-
holding.”107 
[The Whigs’] vision was a burgeoning commercial republic, not a 
backward-looking agrarian one, but it was no less a republic with a 
broad, wide-open, propertied middle class.  Thus, they loudly 
affirmed that a true “American” system of political economy must 
provide as ample as possible a supply of decent livelihoods for the 
laboring classes, along with wide opportunities for laborers to 
become proprietors, and broad avenues to wealth and distinction for 
the gifted and ambitious “poor beginners.”  Not surprisingly, Whigs 
contended that their own economic policies were best suited to these 
core commitments.  And more than that: They argued that 
Jacksonian nostrums like free trade, hard money and “limited 
government” only hurt the very classes the Jacksonians claimed to 
champion.108 
In many respects, the Whigs were right, or at least closer to being right 
than the Jacksonians.  The latter’s anti-aristocratic attacks on the largest 
industrialists and bankers likely brought more economic chaos than relief to 
the growing urban proletariat and rural poor.109  Perhaps most notably, 
Jacksonian constitutional political economy actually accelerated the pace of 
incorporation and the consequent intensification of corporate competition 
and capitalist labor relations. 110   
Over the long run, of course, the Whig and then Republican 
constitutions of opportunity would falter too.  President Lincoln’s vision of 
universal smallholding and small-scale manufacture—premised on the 
elimination of indigenous resistance to Western labor migration and 
unrealistic expectations about the egalitarian potential of capitalist 
development—did put an end to the massive feudal remnant that was black 
slavery.111  But after a brief flirtation with more radical solutions,112 
 
107. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 30). 
108. Id. 
109. See Jane Knodell, Rethinking the Jacksonian Economy: The Impact of the 1832 Bank 
Veto on Commercial Banking, 66 J. ECON. HIST. 541, 547–48 (2006) (noting that the bank veto 
had “destabilizing monetary effects”); Peter L. Rousseau, Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie 
Flows, and the Panic of 1837, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 457, 458 (2002) (arguing that Jacksonian 
monetary policy played a role in the Panic of 1837). 
110. See Robert E. Wright, Capitalism and the Rise of the Corporation Nation, in 
CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND, supra note 81, at 145, 160–67. 
111. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 35–44). 
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Republicans bridled at the massive redistribution that would have been 
necessary to approximate a multiracial property-owning republic.  
Consigning recently freed slaves to neofeudal peonage, Republicans also 
refused to stamp out the vestiges of feudal labor relations in the North, 
decrying labor voluntarism as the gateway to socialism and transforming 
victorious Union soldiers into strikebreakers.113  The industrial oligarchy of 
the late nineteenth century won the electoral support of Northern workers 
and farmers not by recognizing their claims for constitutional authority in 
matters of economic governance, but rather by doling out military pensions 
and tariff protections to soften the blow of their increasingly subaltern 
status.114  Such strategies of population management were at least as old as 
the absolutist states of early modern Europe.115  
In sum, the constitution of opportunity seems to have been a vivid 
discourse for grappling with the intricate relationship between a belated 
feudalism and a booming capitalism in nineteenth-century America.  But 
the speakers of this discourse rarely, if ever, understood the full complexity 
of their political-economic situation, and consistently failed to master it.  Of 
course, this conclusion has all the unearned benefit of hindsight.  But if we 
know now that the constitution of opportunity so often proved misleading 
or ineffectual in the nineteenth century, why should we expect it to fare 
better today?  The most hopeful answer is that such a discourse works best 
once capitalism is (almost) the only game in town and everyone knows it.  
This leads to the question of how the constitution of opportunity weathered 
the twentieth century. 
  
 
112. See id. (manuscript at 46–54). 
113. See id. (manuscript at 44–46, 51–52); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 460–605 
(updated ed. 2014) (exploring the relationship between Reconstruction politics and Northern labor 
politics); ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH 174 
(2015) (noting post-Civil War conflicts over labor republicanism); DAVID MONTGOMERY, 
CITIZEN WORKER 115–62 (1993) (analyzing the political response to the post-Civil War labor 
movement). 
114. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900, at 4–15 (2000).  
115. See, e.g., ROBIN BLACKBURN, BANKING ON DEATH, OR INVESTING IN LIFE 36–39 
(2004) (discussing pension systems in the early modern period); RONALD FINDLAY & KEVIN H. 
O’ROURKE, POWER AND PLENTY 227–310 (2007) (discussing import tariffs in the early modern 
period). 
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III. The Constitution of Opportunity Between Capitalism and Communism 
The current version of Fishkin and Forbath’s manuscript concludes 
with a powerful recommendation: “Rebuilding the democracy of 
opportunity . . . requires reimagining and democratizing the forms of 
ownership and control that prevail over the means of work and social 
production, much as both radicals and elite liberal reformers set out to do 
during the last Gilded Age.”116  Democratization of the means of 
production—what came to be called “economic democracy” during the 
New Deal117—was and remains a radical program, but it is also rife with 
political-economic ambiguity.  As Fishkin and Forbath emphasize, such a 
program does not necessarily entail collective ownership of the means of 
production—socialism or communism.  Indeed, Fishkin and Forbath 
suggest that, by the turn of the twentieth century, proponents of the 
constitution of opportunity had come to accept that the United States “was 
destined to have a vast, permanent class of propertyless wage earners.”118  
In this respect, even the most radical constitutional political economists had 
made their peace with capitalism, in one form or another. 
Here, the consequences for political-economic analysis of focusing on 
the discourse of constitutional political economy are striking.  In the current 
version of their manuscript, Fishkin and Forbath have yet to discuss the 
specifically anti-constitutionalist and anti-capitalist movements for 
political-economic transformation that roiled twentieth-century America, 
including the Socialist Party of America and, later, the Communist Party.119  
Such movements contributed to the relative popularity of left-wing (yet still 
constitutional and capitalist) political economy—the least threatening of 
several radical alternatives—while also repeatedly exposing it to charges of 
guilt by association.120  This dialectic between socialist and capitalist reform 
is crucial to explaining the rise and fall of the twentieth century’s 
constitution of opportunity, and will hopefully be incorporated in Fishkin 
and Forbath’s final text. 
At the dawn of the new century, proponents of the constitution of 
opportunity abandoned the “old idea . . . that ownership of productive 
property . . . was the material basis of middle-class-ness and of full 
 
116. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 90). 
117. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 72 (Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 2003) (1958). 
118. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 55). 
119. See ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE 218–253, 371–408 (1991); EUGENE M. 
TOBIN, ORGANIZE OR PERISH 148–150, 203–237 (1986); see also AZIZ RANA, THE RISE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 81–102 (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author) (discussing the Socialist Party of 
America’s radicalized discourse, in which the Constitution was depicted as a “trick[],” an 
instrument of class rule). 
120. See generally LANDON R.Y. STORRS, THE SECOND RED SCARE AND THE UNMAKING OF 
THE NEW DEAL LEFT (2013). 
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membership in the political community.”121  In its place, they embraced the 
“new insight” that the “economic base” of full, free, and dignified 
citizenship could be secured for wage labor by means of an intricate web of 
legal regulation: “minimum wages and maximum hours laws,” “safety 
standards,” “social insurance,” and, perhaps most importantly, collective 
bargaining.122  This “new constitutional narrative of economic and social 
development,” which held that the Constitution mandated the creation of a 
unionized republic of wage laborers, experienced some initial success 
during the Progressive Era but truly came into its own during the New Deal, 
a regime that remains the cornerstone of liberal legal thought.123  And yet 
the emphatically constitutional program to democratize American 
capitalism—the intellectual infrastructure of the New Deal—has been 
lost.124  Why? 
One answer frequently given by American historians when asked to 
explain the decline of the New Deal order is its refusal—or inability—to 
extend the promise of economic egalitarianism to African-Americans and 
women.125  Building on this historiographical tradition, Fishkin and Forbath 
astutely analyze the extent to which the constitution of opportunity 
excluded racial and sexual egalitarianism, both during the Progressive and 
New Deal Eras.126  Fishkin and Forbath also allude to other externalist 
explanations: the “postwar boom years” and “the rise of professional 
economists” to positions of influence in government “muted” the sorts of 
political disagreement that were once fought out on constitutional terrain.127  
But “the most essential thread” in their explanation of the “Great 
Forgetting” is strikingly legal and internalist.128  Because the New Dealers 
secured their political-economic vision by convincing the Supreme Court in 
1937 that this vision was not of constitutional concern, permitted but not 
required by the Commerce Clause and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, “the paradigmatic constitutional battleground” shifted from 
“economic policy” to “civil liberties—and later, civil rights.”129  In an 
“ironic result,” the “fight over New Deal economics” (a fight that was, in 
truth, fueled by deep constitutional commitments) was “settled” by taking 
political economy off the constitutional table.130 
 
121. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 56) (emphasis omitted). 
122. Id. (manuscript at 56–57) (emphasis omitted). 
123. Id. (manuscript at 57–59). 
124. Id. (manuscript at 65). 
125. See generally KATZNELSON, supra note 25; ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF 
EQUITY (2001); ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY (2012). 
126. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 58, 60–61). 
127. Id. (manuscript at 65). 
128. Id. (manuscript at 65–66). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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The problem with this explanation is that political economy was not, in 
fact, taken off the constitutional table during the late 1930s and 1940s.  Or 
rather, it only makes sense to say that it was if one adopts the sort of rigidly 
formalistic and judge-centered understanding of constitutionalism that 
Fishkin and Forbath otherwise reject.131  To the contrary, the “switch in 
time” of 1937 was swiftly followed by a series of severe constitutional 
challenges to the New Deal political-economic order.132  These challenges 
were themselves fueled by domestic and international political-economic 
crises, as the United States lapsed back into a bruising recession in mid-
1937, and Nazi aggression—culminating in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 
with communist Russia and the invasion of Poland in 1939—threatened to 
shutter all of Eurasia to free trade.133  Aided by economic failure at home 
and the ascendance of fascism and communism abroad, conservatives in 
Congress, the bar, and the press launched an all-out assault on the New 
Deal administrative state, decrying it as the anticonstitutional beachhead of 
domestic totalitarianism.134 
This offensive was well-served by the coincidence of the 1937 
recession with the Congress of Industrial Organizations’ unpopular strike 
wave.135  The CIO’s campaign was seen by some as a cause of the downturn 
and by many others as symptomatic of the New Deal’s irresponsible 
encouragement of the most radical—even communist—elements of the 
labor movement.136  As Professor Barry Karl writes: “Amid declining 
industrial production and soaring unemployment, the call for more radical 
action was replaced by concern for what the supposed radical action of the 
New Deal had already done . . . .”137  That summer, Roosevelt’s court-
packing plan was defeated, not because it was no longer “necessary,” but 
because moderate and conservative legal and media elites successfully 
 
131. See id. (manuscript at 63) (distinguishing between court-centered and more popular 
forms of constitutionalism that had been prominent features of American legal and political debate 
prior to the mid-twentieth century). 
132. See Jeremy K. Kessler, A War for Liberty: On the Law of Conscientious Objection, in 3 
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 447, 459–60 (Michael Geyer & Adam 
Tooze eds., 2015). 
133. KATZNELSON, supra note 25, at 246–47; ADAM TOOZE, THE WAGES OF DESTRUCTION 
318–21 (2006). 
134. See LARRY CEPLAIR, ANTI-COMMUNISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 53–64 
(2011); JAMES T. PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW DEAL 211–324 
(1967); RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT’S GOVERNMENT 55–78 (1966); 
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 749–50 
(2016) (reviewing ERNST, supra note 8). 
135. See BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE 136–39 (1983). 
136. See id. at 136–39, 154 (drawing the connection between public unease with the 
perceived radicalism of organized labor and a growing distrust of the New Deal in light of the 
1937 recession). 
137. Id. at 154. 
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painted it as an unconstitutional putsch against the rule of law.138  “An 
alliance of southern Democrats and Republicans” rejected much of the rest 
of the President’s second-term agenda the following fall, delivering 
Roosevelt “perhaps[] the most significant defeat of his presidency.”139  
Legislative resistance to the New Deal only stiffened when President 
Roosevelt responded to his 1937 losses with a failed purge of Jim Crow 
Democrats in the 1938 primaries—a last-ditch effort to extend the 
constitution of opportunity to the South.140 
Meanwhile, the American Bar Association (ABA) prepared a series of 
broadsides against the “administrative absolutism” of the New Deal, 
comparing its regulatory agenda to the illiberal regimes of Nazi Germany 
and Stalinist Russia, and its constitutional defenders to Soviet legal 
theorists.141  The focus of these attacks on New Deal administration was the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the institutional foundation of the 
constitution of opportunity’s unionized republic of wage laborers.  In the 
1938 midterms, moderate Republican lawyers assailed the NLRB as 
corrupted by “class feeling,” and argued that only less biased personnel and 
more restrictive procedures could legitimate an agency tasked with 
answering “fundamental questions of human right and even of human 
liberty.”142 
In 1940, Roosevelt himself purged the agency of its left-wing 
members, battered by charges of communist infiltration.143  That same year, 
the ABA’s proposal to subject New Deal agencies—the NLRB foremost 
among them—to onerous new procedures and expansive judicial review 
passed both houses of Congress.144  Facing an imminent war with Nazi 
Germany, Roosevelt vetoed the bill on national security grounds.145  But the 
needs of military mobilization led the President himself to embrace an 
increasingly antitotalitarian constitutional discourse that contrasted an 
Anglo-American tradition of limited government and individual rights with 
 
138. See Kessler, supra note 132, at 458–61 (discussing this framing).  Reflecting the mood 
of the time, a constituent of Senator William Borah—himself a strong defender of judicial 
independence—described Roosevelt’s plan as a “headlong rush into the CHASM where STALIN, 
MUSSOLINI, and HITLER have led their countries.”  PATTERSON, supra note 134, at 87.  The 
New York Herald Tribune agreed: “This is the beginning of pure personal government.  Do you 
want it? . . .  Look around the world—there are plenty of examples—and make up your mind.”  Id. 
(quoting Dorothy Thompson, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 11, 1937, at 23). 
139. KARL, supra note 135, at 168. 
140. Id. at 160–61; KATZNELSON, supra note 25, at 175. 
141. Special Committee on Admin. L., Am. B. Ass’n, Report of the Special Committee on 
Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 343, 361 (1938). 
142. ERNST, supra note 8, at 98–101. 
143. STORRS, supra note 120, at 61–62. 
144. See Kessler, supra note 134, at 754–56. 
145. Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the Military Authority Exception in the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 690 (2010). 
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the statist legal regimes of the United States’ enemies, including, at the 
time, Soviet Russia.146  In the wake of WWII, with Nazi Germany defeated 
but Russian troops on the doorstep of Western Europe, President Truman 
signed into law a watered-down version of the ABA’s prewar legislative 
program—the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).147  Hailed at the time 
in manifestly constitutional terms as a “bill of rights for the administrative 
state,”148 the APA is recognized today as “super-statute” of constitutional 
significance.149 
Debates about the exact political-economic valence of the APA are 
still ongoing.150  But there was and remains little doubt about the 
significance of the next three quasi-constitutional attacks on the constitution 
of opportunity.  In the 1946 midterms, the Republican Party took control of 
Congress for the first time in eighteen years.151  Running on a platform of 
rabid anticommunism, the Republicans accused the Truman administration 
of Soviet sympathy and anticapitalist subversion.152  In March 1947, 
Truman covered his right flank by instituting a federal loyalty apparatus, 
which continued the purge of left-wing administrators begun seven years 
earlier at the NLRB.153  That same month, with Republican support, the 
President funneled $400 million to anticommunist forces in Greece and 
Turkey, and announced the “Truman Doctrine,” declaring that “it must be 
the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”154  
Then in May, just as the Cold War was heating up, the Office of Price 
Administration, a powerful wartime mechanism of property control, was 
liquidated.155  Finally, in June, Republicans joined with Southern 
 
146. See generally Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the Administrative State: World War II and 
the Decline of Expert Administration, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW 185 (Daniel R. Ernst & 
Victor Jew eds., 2002); John W. Wertheimer, A “Switch in Time” Beyond the Nine: Historical 
Memory and the Constitutional Revolution of the 1930s, in 53 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND 
SOCIETY 3 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010). 
147. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1669–75 (1996).  For continuities 
between the APA and the earlier anti-New Deal administrative law reform bill, see id. at 1590–93; 
and James E. Brazier, An Anti-New Dealer Legacy: The Administrative Procedure Act, 8 J. POL’Y 
HIST. 206, 210–12 (1996). 
148. JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE 60 (2012) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
149. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 393, 466 (2015). 
150. See generally Kessler, supra note 132. 
151. ROBERT J. DONOVAN, CONFLICT AND CRISIS 237 (1977). 
152. Id. at 231–34. 
153. STORRS, supra note 120, at 84. 
154. JAN OZMAŃCZYK, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 2378–79 (Anthony Manzo ed., 2003). 
155. See MEG JACOBS, POCKETBOOK POLITICS 225–31 (2005). 
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Democrats to override Truman’s veto of the Taft–Hartley Act, a direct 
assault on the NLRB and the industrial unions that had formed the base of 
the New Deal coalition.156 
A series of amendments to the New Deal’s crown jewel, the 1935 
National Labor Relations Act, Taft–Hartley spelled the beginning of the end 
of the unionized republic of wage labor.157  The law vindicated many of the 
demands of the still-fledgling, but constitutionally portentous, “right to 
work” movement, privileging individual “choice” over collective action in 
the workplace and subjecting labor administration to greater judicial 
control.158  It also required every union leader to file an affidavit swearing:  
that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with 
such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or 
supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow 
of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or 
unconstitutional methods.159 
The enemies of the New Deal’s constitution of opportunity had 
discovered a powerful new constitutional political economy in 
anticommunism, which portrayed a great deal of federal microeconomic 
regulation as anathema to constitutional democracy while entrenching new 
forms of labor discipline as constitutional bulwarks against communist 
lawlessness.160  This anticommunist constitutionalism had already stopped 
the New Deal in its tracks in the late 1930s.161  While President Truman 
tried to resist the harshest effects of anticommunism on New Deal labor 
relations, his 1947 declaration of war against communism assured its 
supremacy.162 
Fishkin and Forbath pick up this thread in their last chapter, noting that 
the defeat of unionization lies at the heart of our contemporary “Gilded 
Age,”163 and tracing this defeat back to Taft–Hartley and subsequent “right 
to work” legal victories of the 1950s and early 1960s.164  But they treat this 
 
156. See GRISINGER, supra note 148, at 86–90; NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT 
HOME 238–41 (2d ed. 2003). 
157. Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–97 (2012)). 
158. See LEE, supra note 13, at 77 (quoting Cecil DeMille, who felt that despite his loss in the 
courts “his position had been vindicated by Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act”); FISHKIN & 
FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 82 n.230) (noting that Taft–Hartley loosened unions’ 
control over the in.dividual worker’s “right to work”). 
159. Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act, 1947 § 9(h), 61 Stat. at 146 (emphasis 
added). 
160. For the connection between New Deal critics and early Cold War political economy, see 
CEPLAIR, supra note 134, at 75–78. 
161. See supra notes 133–47 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 148–57 and accompanying text. 
163. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 69). 
164. Id. (manuscript at 82–83, 82 n.230). 
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resurgence of “libertarian” constitutional political economy almost like a 
natural fluid, filling the empty vessel that the “Great Forgetting” of 
egalitarian constitutional political economy left behind.165  By putting Taft–
Hartley and its progeny back in the political-economic context of late New 
Deal and early Cold War anticommunism, a different picture emerges: one 
in which the constitution of opportunity was not forgotten but purged.166 
Fishkin and Forbath’s trope of “forgetting” depends on their 
description of the “postwar period” as an era in which “the parties . . . were 
simply not all that far apart.  Their divisions over economic matters did not 
disappear, but with the anti-New Deal faction defeated, those divisions were 
smaller.”167  But the anti-New Deal faction was not in fact defeated.  The 
constitutional political economy of anticommunism that this faction had 
settled on in the late 1930s became the bipartisan lingua franca of the 
postwar world.  Anticommunism precluded—at times through criminal 
sanctions168—widespread support for Fishkin and Forbath’s constitution of 
opportunity and its call to “democratiz[e] the forms of ownership and 
control that prevail over the means of work and social production.”169  The 
comparatively small political-economic differences between Democrats and 
Republicans in the 1950s and 1960s were an index of the extent to which 
each party had recast itself as what Fishkin and Forbath elsewhere call a 
“party of the Constitution” or a “party of Principle”170—committed not to 
the maintenance of the New Deal order but to the re-articulation of a subset 
of the New Deal’s political-economic ambitions within the parameters of 
anticommunism. 
To be sure, the constitutional political economy of anticommunism 
was not simply antistatist or economically libertarian in the traditional 
sense.  The relatively egalitarian exercise of the federal government’s 
taxing and spending authority and its expansion of civil rights were, in part, 
constitutional responses to the challenge of a competing, communist 
egalitarianism.171  But anticommunism also steadily corroded the legal and 
 
165. Id. (manuscript at 64–67); cf. id. (manuscript at 73–76) (discussing the “libertarian 
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all progressive causes.”). 
167. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 65). 
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120. 
169. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 90). 
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171. See CRAIG & LOGEVALL, supra note 29, at 113–14, 136–38; MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD 
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 12 (2000); AARON L. FRIEDBERG, IN THE SHADOW OF THE GARRISON STATE 
81–97 (2000); James T. Fisher, “A World Made Safe for Diversity”: The Vietnam Lobby and the 
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political infrastructure that would prove necessary to preserve economic 
egalitarianism in the face of growing monetary and fiscal imbalances.  
These imbalances reached a tipping point as early as 1968,172 exacerbated 
by several features of anticommunist political economy: Cold War military 
spending;173 fragmentary unionization under conditions of continual red-
baiting (union density steadily declined after 1954);174 the proliferation of 
capital-friendly tax expenditures;175 and the failure to impose more labor-
friendly wage–price ratios.176  This last intervention would have given 
workers a greater share of the returns to capital while loosening the bond 
between middle-class prosperity and inflationary growth.  But it was 
anathema in an anticommunist republic. 
Conclusion 
Amid growing economic inequality, and growing awareness of that 
problem in the legal academy,177 The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution has done 
the vital work of bringing political economy back into constitutional 
history, where it has long been absent.  But that absence is itself explicable 
by political-economic developments that Fishkin and Forbath’s narrative 
does not yet fully capture.  This Essay has argued that a fuller integration of 
political-economic analysis and constitutional history will require more 
attention to the political-economic conditions of constitutional discourse, 
even where that discourse is itself “about” political economy.  These 
conditions include the anticonstitutional and anticapitalist social movements 
that shaped the constitution of opportunity during the twentieth century.   
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The political economy of Cold War anticommunism, in turn, supplanted 
both this anticapitalist tradition and its moderate double—the constitution 
of opportunity.  Accordingly, the construction of a more egalitarian political 
economy will not simply be a matter of remembering a forgotten 
constitutional language.  The success of such a project will depend upon the 
destruction of the material and discursive structures that silenced this 
language in the first place.  
 
